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War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may
be conveyed directly to the Director of Research by calling
commercial (717) 245-3234 or DSN 242-3234.

FOREWORD
U.S. relations with Africa have always come low on the list
of overall U.S. foreign policy interests, after Europe, Asia, the
Middle East, and the Americas. This prioritization is logical in
terms of overall global U.S. strategic, political, and economic
interests. At the same time, in a striking anomaly, during 1993
nearly 30,000 members of the U.S. armed forces were deployed in
Africa at one time or another. Army and Marine units were
primarily involved in operations in Somalia that ended March 31,
1994. Within a few months, U.S. forces were involved in a
desperate attempt to provide humanitarian support to war-torn
Rwanda. Africa remains a minefield of issues with the potential
of involving the United States, either bilaterally or through the
United Nations or regional organizations.
Ambassador Daniel H. Simpson addresses the question of U.S.
interests in Africa and past, present, and future U.S. policy
toward that continent of more than 50 countries and 800 million
people on an analytic basis, followed by clear recommendations.
His presentation of U.S. strategic interests in Africa permits
clear analysis of the present and logical planning of future
policy and actions.
His message, in addition to being an introspective
examination of U.S. policy, is forward-looking. He seeks to lay
the basis for a long-term, sustainable U.S. policy toward Africa
based on both solid economic and commercial concerns--Africa as a
supplier and a market--and on the real cultural ties that link
what is core to America and the people of the African continent.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
study in hopes that it may be of assistance to those involved in
the development and implementation of U.S. policy toward Africa.

JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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U.S. AFRICA POLICY:
SOME POSSIBLE COURSE ADJUSTMENT
Introduction.
Given the enormous diversity of the African continent, and
the especially daunting economic, social and political problems
its 53 countries and 800 million people present to a policymaker,
it has always been a challenge for the United States to develop
and implement a cogent policy towards Africa. It has always
seemed somehow easier to formulate policy toward Europe, Asia,
the Americas, and the Middle East. Given the complexity that the
multi-piece African mosaic presents, the difficulty in defining
strategic interests on the continent after the Cold War, and the
economic weakness of most of its nations, there has also been
over the years a tendency sometimes to give it a lower policy
priority among regions. I can remember in previous years scanning
hungrily Presidents' State-of-the-Union and foreign policy
speeches and press conferences for reference to and guidance on
African issues. Frequently it was slim pickings. It was with
great interest that I noted that new Presidential National
Security Adviser Anthony Lake made his first public speech in his
new position on the subject of Africa (at Brookings, May 3,
1993), followed quickly by Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
addressing the African-American Institute May 21, 1993, only four
months into the new Administration.
History and Evolution of Current Policy.
It is beyond the scope of this analysis to discuss U.S.
policy toward Africa prior to the 20th century "independence"
period of the late 1950s and early 1960s. Nonetheless, efforts to
make sense of the pre-independence period have not ceased. The
continued primary intention of these efforts is to try to explain
what is going on in Africa now--more precisely usually, what is
going so badly in Africa now--in terms of pre-colonial and
colonial African history. The most recent of these efforts is
Basil Davidson's provocative book, The Black Man's Burden, which
suggests that Africa has been a victim of the framework of the
nation-state, imposed during the colonial period; in Davidson's
view a distinctly un-African and constricting form of
organization of society. This has led, according to Davidson, to
many of the problems that have followed.
It could also be said that the nation-state structure that
Africa inherited from colonial "organization" of the continent
flowed too easily into the Cold War tendency of the rest of the
world to divide nation-states into piles--ours and yours, the
Monrovia group and the Casablanca group, the Marxist-Leninist
states and the "moderates"--characterizations which the Africans
themselves may even have believed to apply, but which
unfortunately also fed an ultimately dangerous tendency on the
part of African states to try to play the West and the East

against each other for aid. It was dangerous in the sense that
the end of the Cold War meant the end of the game and a sense of
relief on the part of those who had been squeezed that the game
was over.
Assassinations and coups across the 30 years until 1990 are
the more dramatic and visible political tracks on the road; more
profound and basically unexamined (if not incapable of study) are
the "what might have been" questions: Would Nkrumah have achieved
greater African unity if it had not been determined that his
"non-aligned" meant "anti-Western" and thus "pro-Soviet"?
Of
course, the Soviets played the definitive down-and-dirty trick on
the Africans across the board in exporting their economic system
there, poisoning some African economic wells perhaps for decades
to come.
American policy toward post-independence Africa can be
divided roughly into stages, the last of which are the present
and the future, which is where we will focus. The first of these
took place in the springtime of the early 1960s. The United
States recognized Western Europe's asserted preeminence in
Africa, but, nonetheless, insisted on carrying out President
Roosevelt's and Prime Minister Churchill's pledge in the (1941)
Atlantic Charter to "respect the right of all peoples to choose
the form of government under which they will live." The two
leaders sounded the death knell of colonialism with that
unequivocal affirmation of the right of self-determination.
President Kennedy, a particular hero in Africa, determined to
continue to pursue President Eisenhower's policy of extending
diplomatic recognition to and establishing embassies in the new
African states. And, starting in the fall of 1961, we sent off
our own new Peace Corps volunteers to help the new African
countries cope with their colonial heritage, part of which was a
lack of trained personnel in education, health, and all the basic
services, including governance in general.
This approach to Africa reflected Cold War antagonisms. The
U.N. intervention in the Congo (now Zaire) was the first U.N.
peacekeeping effort in Africa, designed to keep the Soviets out.
Probably the first dose of really cold water was administered to
us by Africans themselves when, on January 13, 1963, Togolese
troops under the leadership of then Sergeant and even now hardy
dictator Gnassingbe Eyadema, cornered independence President
Sylvanus Olympio, despite his efforts to take refuge in the
American Embassy compound, and killed him. Much more of this sort
of unpleasantness was to follow for years, until the end of the
Cold War. The new beginning freed us to begin to determine our
approach to African countries to a much greater degree in terms
of American supported principles of democracy, market economies,
and sensitivity to environmental and human rights concerns.
Current Policy.

These principles are the foundation and framework of the
U.S. African policy in place now. This policy includes active
support of democratization, aid directed toward sustainable
economic development, the building of free market economies,
attention to environmental concerns, respect for human rights,
and an active role for us and others in conflict resolution, when
needed. We seek to strengthen and to work with and through
international and regional political, economic, and financial
institutions. We promote democracy, not just as a system that has
worked for us, but also as a system that encourages the
development of the element of economic accountability that has
been so often missing from governance in Africa. We promote this
approach as an alternative to systems that have failed in Africa
and elsewhere: the one-party state, the military dictatorship,
African or any other socialism, even Empire. It is a decent
policy; it is an American policy.
Nonetheless, problems and some relevant, troubling facts
still remain. Competing interests have translated into generally
decreasing aid levels. In my view, a shift in the level of U.S.
commitment to dealing with the problems of Africa's
ever-increasing number of "failed states" in the face of the U.S.
experience in Somalia is a present fact in looking at immediate
future U.S. relations with African countries. Although in terms
of impact on our population the losses incurred in Somalia
October 3, 1993, were not in the range of the impact of Vietnam
two decades ago, we felt real pain watching what occurred in the
streets of Mogadishu.
Real Premises: A Sound Basis for Policy.
So, U.S. African policy must now, post-Somalia, be based on
more prosaic, but nonetheless real premises, as opposed to the
idea that we have to feed everyone everywhere, that everyone has
the right to live under a democratically-chosen government, one
which is carrying out "sustainable economic development," one
which is sensitive to its national environmental
responsibilities, and interested in conflict resolution in its
own country and elsewhere. This is not to say that we should not
differentiate, or not show preference to countries that take an
approach to governance consistent with our own. We will do that
because we are Americans, in any case. But clearly for now we are
ready to spend much less money, and no American blood, in
implementation of such policy objectives.
Clear Away the Myths.
So what are sound bases for a sustainable U.S. African
policy? One to consider is U.S. strategic interests in Africa.
Conventional wisdom is now that there are none. To examine that
hypothesis, it may first serve some purpose to dispose of a few
myths. (We can always continue to hope slyly that it is no longer
necessary to dispel myths.) Some of these "interests" always were

myths; others were creatures of the Cold War; some others were
used as shorthand by those who liked to believe that the
apartheid regime in South Africa really had "the right approach"
to governing that country.

Geostrategy. One of these myths was the "Cape sea route"
argument, as part of an overall strategic lines of communication
(SLOC) concern. The "Cape sea route" argument was underpinning
for the idea that we needed to cozy up to the white government in
South Africa because otherwise a hostile majority rule government
in South Africa, controlled by Moscow, would install itself on
the Cape of Good Hope and interdict shipping at the intersection
of the Atlantic and Indian Oceans. The valid part of that
argument was that the Cape of Good Hope did provide a good spot
from which one could possibly track shipping around the Cape, if
one wished to. The really weak part of the "Cape sea route"
interdiction argument was that it conveniently ignored the fact
that some 2,450 miles of blue water lie between the Cape and
Antarctica. Secretary Christopher pronounced the final
benediction on that line of argument in his May 21, 1993 speech:
"Thankfully, we have moved beyond the point of adopting policies
based on how they might affect the shipping lines next to Africa
rather than the people in Africa."
The "interdiction," "strategic lines of communication"
arguments are slightly more valid for the Straits of Gibraltar,
if we consider that passage an African question since one side is
Morocco. There are also the two ends of the Red Sea, accessible
from Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. It is true
that the African continent abuts upon and provides possible
points of interdiction to the Red Sea, with the Suez Canal to the
Mediterranean Sea at the northern end, and with the Bab el Mandeb
at the southern end, with access to the Gulf of Aden and then the
Indian Ocean.
At the same time, these are scarcely "African" questions, in
the sense that our relations with African governments seriously
impact upon them. The Suez, access to which and use thereof is
very old, well-trodden history, is only slightly an African
issue. As for the shores and the other end of the Red Sea at the
Bab el Mandeb, in the wake of the scalded cat reaction of the
world to Iraq's move against Kuwait and its oil and the massive
power so visibly employed against Iraq in the event, it is very
difficult to imagine that the government of a weak African nation
would undertake to levy ransom on or to threaten interdiction of
the Red Sea route. That would have to be the work of a much more
formidable potential adversary. The Red Sea littoral African
states--with the exception of Egypt, which wouldn't--lack the
means now. If the means were acquired, it is hard to imagine that
the world's hand would be stayed for long from simply removing
the means of interdiction quickly and neatly.
A fact of world "choke point" geostrategy, whether it be
with respect to Straits of Gibraltar, the Bab el Mandeb, or any

other geographic feature, is that if a serious enemy were likely
to sink an American ship or a ship of one of our major allies in
one of those places, it would presumably also be willing to sink
one in the North Atlantic or the Western Pacific. And if it did
that, we would have on our hands a completely different strategic
problem, one which would make "control" of an African passage a
marginal issue, if it ever were not.
The only other geographic pieces of possible U. S. strategic
interest in Africa are port access and overflight clearance. But,
in fact, lots of ports up and down the coasts compete for
traffic. The problem there is rather one of infrastructure,
efficiency, and economic interest--a commercial matter post-Cold
War. Overflight clearance is sought, and available, from courtesy
and responsiveness to international practice. What states have
the means to deny it in any case if it were necessary to have?
U.S. Africa policy in any case should have a more solid base than
the transient existence of U.S. "global adversaries," which,
after all, come and go, be they World War I's Central Powers,
World War II's Axis powers, or the Soviet Union. Whatever
geostrategic interests remain after the Cold War, they are much
less relevant than other enduring interests that are a better
basis for continuing American engagement in Africa.

Minerals or Commodities. Then there is the strategic mineral
argument. It is trite but true to say that Africa is a treasure
house of strategic minerals. It has chromium, platinum, cobalt,
copper, zinc, manganese, and oil. In my view, this, however, is
not a "strategic" interest; it is a commercial opportunity.
Africa also has diamonds and gold. It has coffee and cocoa.
At one time a lot of time and energy was devoted by the U.S.
Government and some members of Congress to developing and
maintaining the position that U. S. relations with Africa,
especially with parts of then white-ruled southern Africa-Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa--should be driven by our
need for access to strategic minerals. For years we defied a U.N.
trading ban on Ian Smith's white minority- ruled Rhodesia because
of its chromium production. One reason we helped Zaire's
President Mobutu keep rebels out of Zaire's Shaba (ex-Katanga)
Province was because of its cobalt production. The idea was,
basically, that if we were denied those sources of those
minerals, we either couldn't get the needed minerals or the
Soviets might tie up the other sources and it would be curtains
for the Western world.
This, too, seems to me to be more of a commercial argument
than a geostrategic one, or, in the case of Rhodesian chrome, a
"code" U.S. politico-racial dispute. That approach reached its
limits of tragicomic potential in Angola, where, for years, Cuban
troops guarded American oil production installations on behalf of
an African Marxist government. A lot of Angola's oil was exported
to the United States; the U.S. companies involved made money. The
Cuban troops were paid for by the American oil revenues. The

Marxist government was kept in power by Soviet and Cuban forces,
which were fighting the ostensibly pro-Western guerrilla
movement, UNITA. UNITA, by the way, at the same time was being
supported in its effort to defeat Cuban, Soviet, and government
forces by the United States and South Africa. It would have made
a good Alec Guinness movie except that so many people got killed
or starved. That one is still going on, of course, even though
the Cold War foundation of it is now long gone.
The bottom line on commodities--and chromium and cobalt are
basically commodities, just like pork bellies and orange juice,
even though they are used for aircraft engines and the like--is
that they are fundamentally a commercial and investment trading
matter. That was probably true even during the Cold War. It is
definitely true now. Zaire's mineral-rich Shaba province was
invaded twice in the late 1970s. Both invasions were very
low-budget operations--guerrillas numbering only in the hundreds,
low-tech armed, badly trained, of unclear genesis, with lots of
reports of money going into the external bank accounts of the
"leadership." Both times the price of cobalt went through the
roof on world markets, in 1978 from $6 to $30 a pound, and those
holding stocks of it or futures in it made a lot of money.
With respect to strategic minerals, as well as to other
commodities, it is also true that availability is a function of
price. For example, no cobalt was produced in the United States
during the period when we were wringing our hands about Zaire and
"access" to its cobalt. At that point we had some 13 cobalt
deposits in the United States that could have been operated
profitably if world cobalt prices had risen to a certain level
(25 percent above what they were at that point). A 25 percent
price rise in cobalt would have added $20,000 to the cost of a
Boeing 747 engine, which cost $8.5 million. I am not sorry to see
African products valued. In fact, it is the trading function in
U.S. relations with Africa that I believe should be emphasized,
if those relations are to be put on a long-term sustainable
basis. But we should be spared (and should have been spared) the
hyperbole on African "strategic minerals." I will add
parenthetically that I am as guilty as anyone else on that score,
having served as U.S. Consul General in Zaire's Shaba Province in
the late 1970s and having reached at that time to the right and
left for creative arguments to support our continued involvement
there.
Pursuing the assault on the "economic denial" argument,
international cartels, even the vaunted OPEC, remain notably
undisciplined and weak. This is a natural result of member
countries' inability not to respond to short-run cash-flow
problems. The idea that a poverty-stricken African country, with
major legitimate social service and infrastructure needs and,
probably, very greedy leadership, would be able to forego
exportation of its major foreign-exchange earner or earners
either to "stiff" the United States politically or to push up the
price to a point damaging to our national security is really a

very difficult case to make. We made it on occasion, faced off
across the world with a Soviet Union in full cry. Now, in my
view, it is truly a dead letter as an argument. The 1994 version
of this old argument is that Russia and South Africa are now
going to form a diamond cartel, with forehead-wrinkling
consequences "for the world." Consider the state of solvency of
the two putative partners as well as the strange bedfellows they
would comprise and the argument collapses. These are commercial
matters, in the hands of people who need money badly, ready to
trade what they have, not even always at a good price.
Grounds for a Sustainable Policy.
So what are the grounds for a solid, interest-based U.S.
African policy, if the old geostrategic, strategic minerals, Cold
War arguments no longer are, or never were, valid? Why do we
concern ourselves with Africa? It is not easy and it is sometimes
dangerous as well as expensive to work there. Why should we do
it?
There are a variety of good answers to this question. Some
of them are positive. One of these is the traditional American
interest in economic and financial opportunities. It would be
folly for a trading country like the United States to ignore
Africa in that regard. Fifteen percent of our imported oil comes
from Africa. It is a largely undeveloped commercial market of 800
million potential consumers. How can we not go after that market?
A second good answer is heritage. This one sometimes gets
hyped and misused. However, it is an indisputable fact that a
good solid percentage of Americans hail from Africa, and our
culture is profoundly shaped by African influences. It is
perfectly legitimate for African-Americans to ask us as a country
to take a special interest in Africa.
A third answer to the question of why we should be
interested in Africa is the human, emotional and sentimental side
to us as a people; us in some ways at our best. We cannot do it
all everywhere in the world--agreed--but it is a good thing that
we still have a heart. I, for one, believe that we were right to
go into Somalia in 1992 to create conditions under which children
no longer starved because of the folly and cruelty of their
elders. (The rest of the Somalia argument is beyond the scope of
this essay.) What will we have come to when we can--as we would
have had to--work our way through an American holiday season with
all its excesses with the spectacle of Somali children starving
for want of our action in front of us? That was much more than
CNN-driven policy. There is and will be misery in Africa. We
can't take care of all of it, or even much of it. But when we can
do something that doesn't put American lives at unreasonable risk
or cost so much money that our involvement will not be
sustainable, we should do so.

There is also another hard, practical reason to be
interested in Africa. It is certainly true that a lot of what
happens there that is bad does not touch us, even the worst of
it. We could thus simply say that Africa's problems are not our
concern. Or, to put it more kindly to us, we could say that many
of Africa's problems are beyond our means to deal with. But it is
also a small world that we live in. Diseases, drugs, terrorists,
and even illegal immigrants do not find our borders much of a
deterrent to entering our country and putting themselves
front-and- center on our agenda.
AIDS is a case for examining the potential of U.S.-African
cooperation. Parts of Africa are ground-zero for AIDS; Africa is
also the place where the origins, pathology, means of prevention,
and the quest for a cure have been able to be pursued most
thoroughly through effective experimentation. It is a sad truth
that the enormity of the tragedy of AIDS in Africa has led in
some cases to a very pragmatic, matter-of-fact approach to the
problem on the part of African governments and public health
authorities.
These are the sorts of reasons why we must be interested in
things African, and have an African policy. We cannot responsibly
not be concerned by phenomena such as nests of terrorism,
uncontrolled immigration, international narcotics trafficking,
weapons of mass destruction in irresponsible or hostile hands,
and mobile plagues. At the same time, I believe firmly that in
the balance of affairs, the positive economic, heritage, and
environmental points weigh infinitely more heavily than the
"threat" elements as a basis for an enduring, sustainable U.S.
African policy.
Building Blocks: It's the Economy.
Let us now consider, in greater detail, some of the positive
and defensive building blocks of such a policy. Looking at Africa
again and again and now in the mid-1990s, I am given to conclude
that, for Africa as for President Clinton's successful 1992
campaign, it's the economy that counts. It is manifestly clear
that President Clinton's Administration, consistent with its 1992
electoral mandate, is concentrating its efforts in general
primarily on U.S. domestic economic and social policy. Put
another way, it could be said that it is seeking to tie our
foreign policy more closely to domestic interests.
Virtually all African countries are potentially valuable
trading partners. Take, for example, the Central African
Republic, certainly correctly rated as one of the poorest
countries on the face of the earth by all contemporary economic
standards. It is also a country that has endured notoriously
irresponsible leadership, most notably the Emperor Bokassa.
Nonetheless, the Central African Republic is well-watered--no
droughts like the Sahel--and fully capable of feeding its

population and producing for agricultural export. It has diamonds
for ready cash. The size of Texas, its population numbers fewer
than three million. In my view, it is the case that,
well-managed, the Central African Republic is capable of
providing a very nice living for its population. From our
perspective, its population represents a small but real market
for American exports. Again, managed well and modernized, its
diamond industry is a small but interesting market for American
mining equipment, a field in which we excel. This is not to
gainsay the country's formidable problems, but most of these are
management/governance problems. The management needs work, but
that is underway. The country held real democratic, multiparty
elections in 1992-93.
One does have to continue to believe that through a
functioning democratic process of governance the element of
economic accountability is introduced to the equation. If the
leadership of the country loots the coffee fund or steals the
diamonds, or, perhaps worse, spends all the country's money to
the benefit of the urban population, or, even worse, to the
benefit of the civil servants, there has to be a means of getting
rid of that leadership, short of a coup d'etat or assassination.
We have to believe that democratic leaders, knowing that they
will face regular elections sooner or later, will behave
differently and run the country in a less self-serving way. The
donors, bilateral and multilateral, will have increasingly to put
teeth into that approach. African leaders must be made to know
that "diverting" national or international resources to their own
personal or ethnic ends means that the gravy train will simply
stop running to their countries. "Donor fatigue" and other
competing demands are forcing sharper donor discrimination
already; that approach--a demand for sound, honest economic
management--must become a principle of economic assistance to
African countries.
It must become the case that an African head-of-state comes
to measure his greatness as a leader by the degree of prosperity
and well-being that his country enjoys under his leadership, not
by the amount of wealth he is able to build up for himself and
his extended family in offshore real estate and bank accounts
during his reign.
Virtually all African countries do have sufficient land and
not so large a population that, again, correctly managed, they
could feed themselves and produce for export. Florists' flowers
are now Kenya's fourth largest foreign exchange earner. Mangoes,
literally falling from the trees all over Africa, sell for 15
French francs ($2.50) each in Paris. Virtually every African
country has some source of ready cash--iron ore, copper, oil,
cobalt, diamonds, bauxite, phosphates, cassiterite, nickel, or
something. Many African economies are one-product operations,
lacking export diversity, thus making them ruinously vulnerable
to world market trends far beyond their control. At the same
time, the market has an answer to that problem, short-term

painful perhaps, but an answer. That is to diversify. Africans
should not moan that no one wants to buy their coffee or cotton
or dream of making the importers pay artificially high prices for
their produce through a cartel or a commodity agreement. Instead,
they should grow something that people do want to buy; or
produce, process and sell what they grow now cheaper.
On a continental basis, there are some very important
relevant facts in the U.S.-African economic relationship. In
general it is fair to say that oil as a commodity catches
American attention. Africa provides 15 percent of U.S. oil
imports; the United States buys 30 percent of Africa's oil
production. The Middle East has 60 percent of the world's oil
reserves, but Africa has 10 percent, more than the CIS states,
including Kazakhstan, a current apple of our oil eye. A dozen
African states produce and export oil; others have unexploited
and probably unexplored or underestimated reserves. High
production costs and/or weak or nonexistent infrastructure leave
these reserves in that state. At the same time, companies and
banks also make money building roads and pipelines so there is no
insurmountable barrier to development in this area. The United
States is a great producer and exporter of oil production and
marketing equipment. A pipeline across Chad involves important
contracts and exports; exploiting Chad's oil means that the
Central African Republic's oil becomes accessible and a
potentially viable investment opportunity.
Developing Africa's oil and other resources in a responsible
way clearly presents important environmental challenges. I
believe that these are challenges that can be met; that, in fact,
are better met. Put another way, better that the environmental
challenges of conserving fauna and flora be met head-on, rather
than that the challenges remain unmet and finally, simply be
finessed as the animals and plants at risk are eliminated from
the face of the earth. This will, in fact, otherwise occur,
through the results of population pressure or civil war. This is
not a chimera; it has happened already in Uganda, Angola, Chad,
Zaire, Rwanda, and other countries. At the risk of being
pigeonholed as hopelessly sentimental, I will recall that when I
first went to Benin City, Nigeria as a teacher, back at the dawn
of time (1961), elephants were considered to be omnipresent,
evil, hungry, dangerous creatures that rampaged through villages
trampling urchins; now there simply aren't any elephants there.
South Africa: Current and Critical.
There is a particularly poignant and urgent element in the
present policy need for the United States to concentrate its
engagement in Africa in the economic realm. To delve into this
issue in what otherwise is a continent-wide approach to U.S.
African policy is, in part, to change diskettes in a major way.
It is, however, necessary, for two reasons. First, South Africa,
the issue in question, is at a critical crossroads. Second,

perhaps even more importantly, South Africa's success or failure
may constitute the last chance in decades for Africa to profit,
rather than suffer, from circumstances. Successful South African
negotiation of the difficult transition from apartheid (South
African state racism) to majority rule without destroying the
country's economy gives Africa as a whole the opportunity to
hitch a 20-wheel, fire-belching locomotive to the presently
bumpy, creaking, narrow-gauge African economic train.
The most important part of what is happening in South Africa
in 1994 is, of course, the first multiracial, one-person one-vote
elections ever. Those elections are millennial in their political
impact in South Africa and, in fact, on the African continent and
the world, relegating apartheid to the boneyard of failed,
immoral approaches to human governance. But the hard part starts
as newly-elected President Nelson Mandela begins to try to
govern. The bad news is that governing the new South Africa will
be difficult; the good news is that the changed circumstances
that Mandela's taking office will validate in fact contain within
them the solution to what will be his main problem, how to meet
and fulfill reasonably the economic hopes and aspirations of the
South African population.
At least two fundamental barriers to economic development
and prosperity existed in pre-majority-rule, post-World War II
South Africa. They were, first, the size of the economically
active domestic South African market, and, second, the at least
partial politically-based isolation of South Africa's economy
from the African continental economy. First-class participation
in the domestic economy, in terms of buying power and
capital-generating capacity, resided almost entirely in the South
African white population, at any given time about 15 percent of
the population. In addition, the labor/skills market--from top to
bottom--was skewed grotesquely by apartheid's "job reservation"
laws. (Roughly put, very few blacks, despite their ability, were
in supervisory roles; few whites, without respect to their
competence, were not in supervisory roles. A black doctor could
not supervise a white nurse, for example.) Even the whites were
saved from the long-term development consequences of this
economically- flawed approach only by the existence under the
soil of the country of shocking amounts of gold, diamonds, and
other riches.
The second fundamental barrier to what would have been
normal South African economic development, and to what would have
been normal Africa-wide economic development, was the partial
economic isolation of South Africa from the rest of Africa. This
was the official and basic prevailing state for three critical
decades, from independence until 1990. It is certainly true that
the various economic sanctions imposed by various parties against
trade with and investment in South Africa were always unevenly
enforced and respected. The apples we munched in Lubumbashi came
from the Cape. Even late in the game, some American firms
responded to the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 by

"selling" their assets in South Africa to their local
distributors. At the same time, the "lost opportunity" costs to
South Africa and to the rest of Africa of the relative economic
and commercial isolation of South Africa were formidable. There
is no doubt that the sanctions were seriously instrumental in
finally bringing about political change in South Africa and, in
that sense, were very much worth the candle. On the other hand,
the disengagement from the overall African development process of
the continent's most powerful national economy was very
expensive, to South Africa and to Africa as a whole.
Some of these costs should now be transformed into
opportunities, if it isn't too late and if South Africa's economy
rides out the ongoing political sea change without structural
damage. South African manufactured goods should eventually knock
the socks off French and British imported competition in African
markets. Building and creating the infrastructure to make that
possible should attract and channel investment in South Africa
and in the rest of Africa. America should see this as an
opportunity. Why should African countries always borrow from
international financial institutions or in Europe instead of in
Johannesburg? Why shouldn't African companies be listed on an
African stock exchange? Why should African politicians and
business persons stash their cash in Zurich when it could earn
higher interest, and be plowed back into their own national
economies, through multiracial participatory South African
financial institutions?
The blessing of all this--if it works--is that the possible
surge in South African economic prospects will not only help the
rest of Africa, it will also help solve the new multiracial South
African government's own basic, fundamental problem. That is to
meet the economic aspirations of the now participating majority
of the South African population. This is a very high stakes wager
in that, if it doesn't work this way, the South African economy-the last national African economy capable of pulling the African
development train--risks slipping into the sad, hopeless cycle of
debt, social decline, and eventual political chaos that prevails
in much of the rest of the African continent.
The Role of the United States.
Where do we come into this? The role of the United States
Government in this enterprise must be basically that of
cheerleader and confidence-builder. We can help with manpower
training in South Africa. We can target what bilateral aid we
still send to Africa as a whole toward the economic integration
of the continent. We can cajole and threaten the international
financial institutions through our large participation in them to
row in that same direction with us. The real key, however, is
American business, American private enterprise, American banking,
that hardy band of former Yankee traders who, in their economic
approach to Africa, have generally in recent years shown the

derring-do of an 85-year-old figure skater considering a triple
axel. There is reason to hope, however, that they will be driven
by a nose for profit, if not by heritage or farsightedness, to
interest themselves in South Africa and Africa, with equity
investments as well as with the normal, sometimes ghoulish
concerns with gold and diamonds that fascinate the world economy.
African nations have breathtaking amounts of foreign debt on
the books. African debt constitutes 106 percent of African Gross
Domestic Product (GDP); the debt of Latin American countries
represents 37 percent of Latin American GDP. What to do about
African debt is difficult. Private financial institutions have
written it off. Most debt to governments has been forgiven. But
the West loaned them the money. And sometimes the circumstances
of the loans were seamy--bribes, repayment agreements tied to
particular revenues, endless "studies" and "consultancies"; in
effect, the moral equivalent of taking French, British or
American money out of one pocket and putting it into another, the
cash having passed only figuratively through country "X" as
"development." A loan requires two parties. So just cancel and
forget all of it, but loan no more unless the request comes from
a creditworthy private investor and not a government, and unless
the viability of the investment is crystal clear. There has to be
credit available for development to occur, but the track record
of the past 30 years makes it painfully clear that "concessional
terms" are basically a concession only to our paternalism, their
leaders' greed, and our common folly. "Donor fatigue" is real.
Africa and we have squandered 30 years worth of good will. We
can't afford any more. Africa can't afford any more.
U.S. Policy: Some Course Adjustment Needed.
So where does this put us exactly in terms of concrete U.S.
policy, as it stands at present and what should be done to change
it? First of all, with respect to South Africa, we have grasped
the picture. Hard on the heels of the removal of sanctions,
African National Congress President Nelson Mandela's unequivocal
declaration in September 1993 that sanctions were, in fact, no
longer necessary, and Mandela's and President De Klerk's plea for
full U.S. participation in the South African economy, U.S.
Commerce Secretary Ron Brown led an important and highly visible
mission to South Africa to try to kick-start U.S. economic
involvement in post-apartheid South Africa. The New York Times of
January 9 proclaimed, "Foreigners Flock Back to Johannesburg" and
consumer-vulnerable companies such as Sara Lee, Honeywell, and
Proctor & Gamble are back into South Africa. One senses that a
lot of the heat in Johannesburg is being generated by
speculation, rather than by solid, long-term equity investment,
and that there is still quite a bit of "wait and see" about
investors' approach to South Africa. At the same time, the main
point is that they are there, with a basically positive attitude.
The fact that they are there in a tentative mode should have a
sobering effect on all political elements in the country. All

South Africans should understand--and I believe that many do-that for the economic dreams of all of them to be realized, for
everyone to live well from the very profitable enterprise that
South Africa can be, the political transition must occur without
leaving broken glass all over the floor.
If we accept that the road of a predominantly economic U.S.
involvement in Africa is the right one--in fact, the only one
that is viable and sustainable in post-Cold War U.S. political
terms--as well as being the approach that is best for Africa
itself, in terms of enabling its resources to be engaged in
meeting its peoples' needs and aspirations, then the United
States needs to pursue it more vigorously. This would
significantly complement our interests in peacekeeping,
peace-enforcing, peacemaking, and peace operations.
The Somalia problem has so far absorbed by all accounts a
good $2 billion since it started in 1992. Somalia has seven
million people. U. S. economic aid to Africa in 1994 will come in
under $800 million. The problem of Liberia, with 2.5 million
people, is getting another $30 million poured on it by us in 1994
under a new program. Africa has 800 million people. There are a
number of countries where things are going well, or could be
going well. The message that we may be delivering to African
countries is, basically, "If you want our attention, and, in
particular, our money, fight among yourselves to the point where
economic activity becomes no longer possible and your people flee
and then starve. Oh, and be sure that CNN knows."
We cannot be blind to suffering. We would not be the people
that we are if we were. But Americans' patience is always thin
and our attention span short. The American taxpayer's patience is
especially thin at a time when we are being asked by our
leadership to look at ambitious new approaches to our own social
problems.
In my view, purely and simply, the message of U.S. economic
assistance to Africa, through bilateral and multilateral means,
should be that we help those who take a constructive approach to
building their own countries. That approach does not mean
disengagement from Africa. In fact, some countries are on the
right track with respect to economic development and responsible
government. Some which come to mind as in decent political health
or on the road to it and seriously interested in economic
development are Benin, Botswana, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda, Mauritius, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Cote d'Ivoire,
Mali, Niger, Cape Verde, Senegal, Ghana, and, possibly, Nigeria,
if one accepts that a country of that size and population with
its diverse groups and wealth is difficult to rule cogently. True
Africanists will now be able to tear my thesis apart with cases
of individual countries either included or excluded, but I would
nonetheless maintain that we can differentiate between those
roughly on the right track, and those clearly not. In fact, that
is what the American taxpayer pays Africanists to do. The fact

that we have not always done so skillfully may be part of the
eternal problem of trying to hoist Africa higher in the American
foreign policy pecking order. We have sometimes succeeded in
convincing our people that they should pour their money down a
particular rat hole. That we have done so may have been a tribute
to our eloquence or persuasive powers, but we are now harvesting
the reaction in the form of sometimes indifference and resistance
to involvement in Africa in general on the part of the American
public.
U.S. Structural Adjustments Needed.
While we are hard at work, we should look at a couple of
organizational problems, also in the conduct of U.S. relations
with Africa, that some have suggested need to be fixed in the
name of efficiency, logic, and principle. After the 1973
Arab-Israeli war, the Department of State removed the North
African countries--Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya--from the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of African Affairs and put them into
the then Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs. Those
countries were involved in the Arab/Israel question, a matter of
primordial concern to us, as Arab, "Middle Eastern" countries;
thus, logic in conducting relations with them was based on that
aspect of their nature. Their inclusion with other Arab League
states in that Department of State bureau made administrative as
well as policy sense at that time.
Twenty years later, it may be that that division of
responsibility for countries within the Department of State is
now in fact archaic and the North African countries should be
"returned" to the African continent in terms of the conduct of
U.S. foreign policy. With the forward movement toward success in
the Middle East peace negotiations that has been achieved,
whether the Maghreb states, firmly on the African continent after
all, are lumped with Near Eastern countries or African countries
in terms of carrying out U.S. policy is no longer the major
question that it was in 1973.
There is another aspect to the matter. The line drawn below
North Africa on the State Department map roughly divides "Arab"
North Africa from black, "sub-Saharan" Africa. Elsewhere in the
Department of State such differentiation does not exist.
Australia and New Zealand are part of the Bureau of East Asian
and Pacific Affairs. The "Near East" and "South Asia" parts of
the old Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs were split
into two separate bureaus at Congressional behest in 1993,
presumably at least partly in the name of geographic logic.
Canada remains part of the Bureau of European Affairs rather than
the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, but one wonders how long
that will last as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
is expanded and Canada itself takes a greater interest and role
in the Organization of American States (OAS), linking to a
greater degree U.S. relations with Canada to our relations with

Mexico and other countries in the Americas.
I believe that it is now time, with the Middle Eastern
question on the way to resolution and with the need to tightly
coordinate U.S. relations with all the Arab nations diminished by
the end of the Cold War, to consider restoring the geographic
logic and integrity of the term "African affairs" by transferring
responsibility for the conduct of U.S. relations with the North
African nations back to the Bureau of African Affairs. All of
this reorganization may seem a bit arcane. At the same time,
anyone who has ever worked in an organization knows well that the
structure of an organization determines the locus of
responsibility and power--in fact, the logic of the body.
Some observers have noted that the same cognitive dissonance
exists in the organization of U.S. military relations with
Africa. Africa now falls under the purview of several commands,
several commanders-in-chief. Part of it belongs to the European
Command (EUCOM), part of it belongs to the Central Command
(CENTCOM), and part of our activities in Africa fall under the
authority of our Special Operations Command (SOCOM). I am not
aware that these commands step on each other's feet and I
hesitate at the thought of creating another command in the face
of budget cuts and "reorganizing government," but it is
nonetheless the case that Africa is the sole continent which does
not have a U.S. command specifically responsible for coordinating
and carrying out U.S. military activities within it. In my view
that does not make sense, particularly considering the level of
our recent activities in Africa--in Somalia, in Rwanda, in Kenya,
and elsewhere. The new Africa Command (AFCOM) should be based in
the continental United States, for purposes of economy and
because it would not be obvious in any case where in Africa such
a headquarters should be based. This would not be unprecedented:
CENTCOM is based in Tampa, Florida; the Pacific Command, in
Honolulu; and SOUTHCOM, for Central and South America, is
presently based in the Canal Zone of Panama, with thought being
given to a move to the continental United States as 1999 and the
handover of U.S. installations in Panama to the government of
Panama draw closer. AFCOM would have a staff, but no specific
forces assigned to it.
Thus, I put forward for consideration one major substantive
and two organizational course adjustments of current U.S. Africa
policy. The substantive one is a shift away from crisis-oriented
attention and aid to Africa, to a dollars-and-cents, "Africa as a
financial and commercial opportunity" approach to the continent.
I believe that such a policy is the only long-term sustainable
American approach to Africa. The two structural changes that I
suggest we look at include moving the Maghreb states back into
the Bureau of African Affairs of the Department of State and
mounting a new U.S. military joint command, AFCOM, based in the
United States, to coordinate and be responsible for all U.S.
military involvement in Africa. I believe that these two
structural changes are suggested by logic, efficiency, and

principle in the conduct of U.S. relations with Africa.
Vision.
What should be our long-range vision of Africa and U.S.
relations with the countries that together comprise the
continent? First, it should be that each African country governs
itself in such a way that its people live a decent life from the
land and resources available to it. A decent life is hard to
define, but its obvious components include education, health, the
free exercise of human rights, a functioning system of justice,
and distribution of wealth that does not include extremes that
polarize, but does provide incentives to achieve. African
countries should live at peace inside themselves and with each
other. They should cooperate fruitfully in economic and political
forums, realizing economies of scale and infrastructure whenever
possible, to seek to improve the lot of each of them.
African nations should be responsible citizens of the
planet, acting as conscientious conservators of the portion of
the environment that they occupy. African nations should be
responsible participants in commonly agreed upon international
undertakings, including peace operations when necessary. They
should take a particular responsibility for maintaining order on
the African continent, as much as possible, keeping the peace
among themselves. The rest of the world does not have much means
for it.
What should Africa be for the United States? It can and
should be an interesting and reliable economic partner. We have
things we wish to buy from Africa, we have savings to invest in
Africa, and we have products we wish to sell to Africa. It should
be a place where African-Americans in pursuit of their heritage,
American missionaries, scientists, researchers and
conservationists interested in Africa, and just plain American
tourists wanting to show their children Africa can go and travel
in peace and security, as free as is possible of danger from
disease or violence. We want Africa and Africans to do well. We
want African nations to be strong, healthy, prosperous neighbors
and partners in the world. Obviously, a long way remains to go in
that regard for that state to prevail across the continent, but
despair in the face of disparity between actual circumstances and
what one seeks to bring about is never justified; realism is, and
upon that basis future U.S. policy toward Africa should be
constructed. It can be done.
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